MODELS OF THE MIND : A SURVEY OF SOME RECENT ATTEMPTS IN ANGLO-SAXON PHILOSOPHY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP

Abstract

The general aim of the thesis is a survey of the mind-body problem from its original Cartesian form to more recent formulations in terms of non-Cartesian systems. To a lesser extent, it is also an attempt to trace the course and support the basis of the account of man as a dualistic psycho-physical system (not necessarily in the Cartesian sense). Chapter 1 presents an account of a model late seventeenth century Cartesian metaphysical system within which the mind-body problem is generated. It discusses the nature of Cartesian dualism and the problems within it which arose due to conflicting Cartesian principles themselves, Attempts to resolve the contradictions within Cartesianism led, on the one hand, to further confusion, and, on the other, to new non-Cartesian metaphysics. This chapter serves as a brief historical background to the Cartesian mind-body problem. Chapter 2 is an attempt at defining the contemporary status of the "mental" - at least from the standpoint of one mainstream in the philosophy of mind, Ryle's programme, in The Concept of Mind, is examined in the light of his claim that the "mental" has no special 'privileged' status apart from overt behavioural manifestations and inner dispositions and propensities to behave. The writer agrees with the major portion of Ryle’s thesis - viz. that much of our intelligent and purposeful activities can and do go on in the absence of the "mental" - but rejects his further claim that "mental" events are fictitious "ghosts in this machine". Mental events do occur and they are characterised by their feature of "privileged access" by which the person to whom the events occur knows they occur without having to make the observations or inferences others must make to know of their occurrence. It is also the aim of the chapter to show that the mind--body problem is not a pseudo-problem. Chapter 3 examines the problem of mentality in machines, especially mechanical devices such as servo-mechanisms and computers. Servo--mechanisms simulate, by use of feedback, purposeful human behaviour and computers, by performing logical operations, simulate human reasoning. Many philosophers believe that the solution to the mind-body problem is to be found in the consideration of such machines. Although there are fundamental differences in origin, composition, and design between humans and machines the writer is inclined to believe that, with respect to output, the similarity between man and machine is very close, at least in principle and in relevant respects. But this similarity of output tolls us nothing about the internal similarities of brain and machines. In addition to the "structural" and “logical" operations that machines are capable of performing, could there also occur mental operations or mental events? Some philosophers have tried to dismiss such questions as meaningless, but it seems to the writer that they are quite meaningful. The mind-body problem, in this case, becomes the mind-machine problem, and we have exactly the same possibilities as in the traditional mind-body problem, and the same considerations are relevant in both cases. This makes the question of mentality in machines a genuine empirical issue. Chapter 4 considers the Identity Theory, a variety of monistic theory which has recently been given explicit formulation and discussion. The Identity Theory rests on the empirical hypothesis that there is strict correlation between mental events and some particular physical events in the central nervous system; and this correlation is a relation of strict identity - viz. that mental events turn out to be, as a matter of fact P one and the same as those physical events in the central nervous system. On the one hand, there is still a great deal of vagueness hanging around. the notions: "strict identity" and. "strict correlation" with regard to mental events and brain events, When we say that the Morning Star and the Evening Star are one and the same star, we can explain how the two referring expressions are related. But no Identity Theorist, as far as the writer knows, has done this for mental and physical expressions. On the other hand, the major difficulty in any theory of this sort is the location problem. The physical events which are intimately connected with my having particular mental events have some definite location, probably in the brain. But it makes no sense to talk about a thought’s being located in some place or places in the body. Since brain events occur somewhere in the brain but mental events do not, it follows that they cannot be identical. Since our language and conceptual scheme does not allow us to locate mental events in the brain, an Identity Theory in any of its variants cannot be accepted. The question of whether or not there is a causal connection of some sort between mental events and. brain events is discussed in Chapter 5. One of the main sources of difficulty in determining the issue is the lack of relevant factual information. We do not know if there is any kind of constant, universal correlation between mental events and brain take mental events as non-identical with brain events, the main contenders are Epiphenomenalism and Interactionism. If future information about the brain indicates that there are sequences of brain events which are inexplicable physiologically but explicable in terms of prior mental events, then Interactionism will be the more plausible view. If it seems likely that all brain events are explicable physiologically, then other view is still possible, We could hold that mental events are inefficacious by-products of physiological occurrences or we could hold that they are indispensable causal intermediaries. Epiphenomenalism would have the advantage of offering a simpler account, explaining the physiological only in physiological terms. But it still would be in conflict with our ordinary descriptions of everyday experience, so if we accepted Epiphenomenalism wo would have to abandon or reinterpret our ordinary ways of speaking. The alternative would be to continue to speak the way we do and accept the somewhat more complicated scientific picture of interaction. There is no clear advantage of one alternative over the other. One final alternative would be to accept a dual causation view that in the case of mind and body we have both a physiological and a mental cause of some events, each an independently sufficient cause. This would allow for both a physiological determinism and casually efficacious mental events. Chapter 6 offers, though somewhat speculatively, an alternative model of mind-body. The failure of theories such as the Identity Theory does not reinstate old and unsatisfactory notions of dualism; and, set in a wider context, the physiological facts which have impressed the Identity Theorists might point the way to a better solution of the problem of psychophysical relationship. The model discussed in this chapter is an integrative one, in which numerous functional processes are integrated into a single organised, self-maintaining totality. It is claimed that a theory of this sort avoids the inadequacies of theories such as the Identity Theory yet also meets the objections of the dualist. First it admits a duality of form between the physiological and the psychological and justifies the dualist’s contention that subjective experience is something markedly different from brain process, for instance. At the same time it accords with the patent facts that mental acts and experiences either have no spatio-temporal characteristics or, when they do, have very different ones from physical things. This model of body-mind rotation presents them as two phases of development on different levels of organic integration and avoids the objections which can legitimately be raised both to materialism in the form of a, theory such as the Identity Theory and to dualism of the old-fashioned sort, while still doing justice to the considerations which incline careful and penetrating thinkers to advocate a dualism of some sort.