CHINESE-EDUCATED JOURNALISTS IN POST-INDEPENDENCE SINGAPORE

Abstract

The dramatic changes of the language policies in Singapore had shaped the identity of the Chinese-educated Chinese (huaxiaosheng) as a social minority within the majority. Under the bilingual language policy, English becomes the dominant working language. Being excluded from the communicative channels located in the public domain, the huaxiaosheng occupy a disadvantageous position in the society, in relation to the English-educated (yingxiaosheng). The Chinese-educated working in the Chinese press face a peculiar problem of “three-fold marginalization”. Firstly, on the individual level, many of them have been displaced from the mainstream, based on their Chinese-medium educational background. Their English handicap locates them outside the public domain, rendering them marginalized. They have had to cope with the learning of English, despite working in a predominantly Chinese-speaking environment. On the other hand, the bilingual-educated do not feel handicapped working in the bilingual setting, nor do they perceive any barrier in communicating with their counterparts from the English press. Secondly, the massive shift towards English as the dominant language has resulted in the decline in the standards of the Chinese language among the younger generation. The culminated consequences of the educational changes are manifested in the decline of the readership of the Chinese newspapers among the youngsters. With the elevation of the status of the English press in tandem with that of the English language, the Chinese press is at times displaced from the news communicative channels. This gives rise to the marginalization of the huaxiaosheng journalists, as well as the bilingual-educated journalists, on the institutional level. Lastly, the Chinese-educated journalists were confronted with the problem of 'baggage' (‘baofu') in their vocation as intellectuals. Their identity, framed by their location in the Chinese-medium education, holds strong connotations of cultural chauvinism and political radicalism. The problem of ‘baofu' becomes an impediment in their vocation of maintaining a critical discourse, for fear of being stigmatized. It further perpetuates the social minority status of the huaxiaosheng. In comparison, the bilingual generation of Chinese press journalists, who holds a perceived objective worldview that is shaped by their educational experiences, is less likely to be stigmatized by the images of chauvinism. In the context of modernity, Chinese press journalists are more concerned with the vocation of intellectuals. The Chinese press journalists may be socially located at the center of power, but their critical consciousness situates them at the periphery of political institutions. Given that the journalists are co-opted into power, they fulfill the role of an establishment intellectual, maintaining the culture of critical discourse. While intellectuals need to possess autonomy in speaking the 'truth', the term 'Chinese Elite', which was constructed partly in response to the socio-political developments in East Asia, was to cater to the needs of the state, thus bringing it within the delimited institutional space and is readily policed by the government. Hence, the symbolism attached to the construct 'Chinese Elite' by the political elite does not constitute any meaningful images to the journalists from the Chinese press.