Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0990-z
DC Field | Value | |
---|---|---|
dc.title | Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger’s Law | |
dc.contributor.author | Peeters, R | |
dc.contributor.author | Saran, R | |
dc.contributor.author | Yüksel, A.M | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-10-23T02:44:37Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-10-23T02:44:37Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Peeters, R, Saran, R, Yüksel, A.M (2016). Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger’s Law. Social Choice and Welfare 47 (3) : 729-759. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0990-z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0176-1714 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/179287 | |
dc.description.abstract | Duverger’s Law states that plurality rule tends to favor a two-party system. We study the game-theoretic foundations of this law in a spatial model of party formation and electoral competition. The standard spatial model assumes a linear agenda space. However, when voters vote sincerely, electoral competition on the line under plurality rule gravitates towards a single party located at the median. We therefore depart from the linear space and instead adopt the unit circle as the space of agendas. We characterize pure-strategy (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibria under both sincere and strategic voting. Under both voting behaviors, multiple configurations of parties are possible in equilibrium. We refine our predictions using a new notion called defection-proof (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibrium. Under sincere voting, either two or three parties are effective in defection-proof Nash equilibria, whereas under strategic voting, either one or two parties are effective in defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. These results are partially consistent with Duverger’s Law. © 2016, The Author(s). | |
dc.publisher | Springer New York LLC | |
dc.rights | Attribution 4.0 International | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Unpaywall 20201031 | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.contributor.department | YALE-NUS COLLEGE | |
dc.description.doi | 10.1007/s00355-016-0990-z | |
dc.description.sourcetitle | Social Choice and Welfare | |
dc.description.volume | 47 | |
dc.description.issue | 3 | |
dc.description.page | 729-759 | |
dc.published.state | Published | |
Appears in Collections: | Elements Staff Publications |
Show simple item record
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | Access Settings | Version | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
10_1007_s00355-016-0990-z.pdf | 783.65 kB | Adobe PDF | OPEN | None | View/Download |
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License