MORAL REALISM

Abstract

This is an essay about a set of metaethical theories that have come to be known as moral realism. Over the last twenty years or so, much of the work within philosophical ethics have been concerned with discussing the debate between moral realists and their opponents. Most moral philosophers now accept that some form of cognitivism about ethics is true, The effort has been to show in what this truth consists in. Moral realists argue that ethics is or can be cognitivist and objectivist in nature. They point to a distinctive moral reality which provides the truth-conditions for well-formed, meaningful ethical claims. Two versions of moral realism are distinguished in this essay, and both are evaluated for coherence and correctness. A conceptual framework is also provided to highlight the links with issues like objectivity, cognitivism, truth, and realism. The central thesis of the moral realist - that it is the metaphysical objectivity of ethical features which provides the necessary condition for logical objectivity - is found to generate inconsistencies with our moral phenomenology.