OTHER-REGARDING NUDGES: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, COLLECTIVE INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE

Abstract

Libertarian paternalism is the view that it is permissible for a relevant authority to encourage agents to make choices that benefit them, even though the agent remains unaware that they are being encouraged to do so. This project focuses on a special case of the theory: other-regarding nudges. That is, I consider whether it is permissible for the state to encourage its citizens qua agents to make particular choices, where those choices primarily yield benefits for those other than the nudged agent. Nudges share a similar structure to that of classically paternalist interventions, and libertarian paternalists face a dilemma in trying to remain committed to individual choice; leaning into liberty undermines the practical import of these interventions, while leaning into paternalism compromises their normative heft. I argue that Libertarian paternalism does not avoid the charge that it is straightforwardly paternalistic. Nevertheless, I hold that some other-regarding nudges may be justified.