VISION AND CHOICE IN MORALITY : THE RELEVANCE OF CONTEMPORARY WESTERN ANALYTICAL METHODS TO TRADITIONAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

The argument of this thesis begins from a consideration of how far moral philosophers in the analytic tradition, who have defined the aims of their analysis as a study of the language of morals and~ logic of moral discourse, have been able to arrive at some fundamental definition of morality and have succeeded in illuminating the nature of moral discourse. In the first chapter, I begin by questioning the assumptions behind this whole approach. I argue that the feasibility of arriving at some kind of fundamental characterisation of the language or the logic of morals rests on the assumption that moral concepts are a 'timeless limited, unchanging, determinate species of concept'. Moral concepts however, can and do function differently within different conceptual frameworks. They are embodied in and are partially constitute of forms of social life. To understand a concept is to be able to grasp the role of that concept in language and in social life, so to understand moral language involves necessarily understanding the forms of life which are reflected in that moral language. They can only be fully understood in relation to that general framework of thought and action, that form. of life, of which it is an essential part and to which it is internally related. Moral differences may therefore often arise from conflicting forms of life, conflicting conceptual alignments, conflicting perspectives on the world, man and society. In Chapter 2, I illustrate how a particular vision, the Confucian, with its particular conceptions of man, the individual and society, and the world determine a particular identification of ends, virtues and ideals. These find their expressions within a particular moral vocabulary, which embody and express the whole form of life. I also try to show how this vision is fundamentally at odds with alternative conceptual frameworks. The Confucian framework operates with essentially different conceptions of man, society, the individual, and the ultimate real values, from the Liberal or the Existentialist framework. If one argues that morality is embodied in and partially constitutive of forms of life, and the different forms of life provide different roles for concepts, then it follows that when forms of life change, there must be the consequent changes in meaning and use of concepts, or there must be n change in the conceptual framework. Alternatively, to change concepts by destroying the old or by making new concepts available is to change ultimately behaviour and forms of life. This brings us to a consideration of how such a change, how a decision to forsake an old conceptual framework for a new one, may come about. From the consideration of a particular historical example, of how the crisis situation of China at the turn of the century brought about the rejection of the Confucian framework, I try to elicit some general points which may be illuminating to the general problem of moral choice. The essential point is that moral choice fundamentally involves not, as R.M. Hare suggests, a choice of stand-point of evaluations in a given world of facts, but a choice between alternative forms of life. I do not attempt a general answer to the problem of moral choice so defined. My arguments find their place as exploratory attempts, through considering particular situations in which the question may arise, which may suggest points of interest for consideration in approaching the general problem. If one understands moral choice to involve ultimately choosing between fundamentally different conceptions of the world, man and society, or fundamentally different forms of life, then certain limitations and implications follow. I discuss some of these in the final chapter, where I also discuss the implications on the nature and tasks of moral philosophy.