COUP OR CO-OPT: RETHINKING MILITARY BEHAVIOUR IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

Abstract

This thesis is a contribution to the study of the strategic behaviour of the armed forces in authoritarian regimes, seeking to examine what influences the military’s decision-making calculus when they decide to rebel. While the most discernible feature of military insubordination against a regime is the coup d’état, another method exists in the nexus between the coup d’état and subordination to the regime, where the armed forces decides to support the popular protests instead. Premised on the context of mass uprisings with the goal of regime change, what remains puzzling is the variation observed in the strategic behaviour of the armed forces when they decide to revolt against the authoritarian regimes. Against the backdrop of such mass mobilisation, some militaries directly intervene to seize power for themselves through a coup d’état, whilst others revolt by supporting the popular protests. To address this puzzle, this thesis introduces a rationalist perspective to military behaviour when revolting. Assuming the rationality of the armed forces, whereby decisions are made based on a cost-benefit calculus in which the benefits are maximised vis-à-vis the costs, it is argued that the interplay of military cohesion and civil society influences the strategic behaviour of the armed forces when revolting. The armed forces is more likely to revolt via a coup d’état when the military is cohesive, and when civil society is strong. Conversely, the armed forces is more likely to revolt by supporting the popular protests when cohesion is lacking within the military, and when civil society is weak. Utilising the within-case comparative approach, the rationalist logic to military behaviour when revolting is examined and validated through the case study of Egypt by studying the events of 2011 and 2013 respectively.