SATISFICING VOTERS: EXPLAINING DURABLE ONE-PARTY-DOMINANT RULE IN SINGAPORE

Abstract

This thesis examines Singapore, a durable competitive authoritarian regime. Using the framework of bounded rationality, I argue that electoral support is not always wholehearted – rather, there also exist lukewarm regime supporters, who vote for the incumbent despite feeling disgruntled. Limitations in time, cognitive ability, and information affect decision-makers, so they satisfice by settling for an “okay” option instead of searching for an ideal one. The competitive authoritarian regime imposes additional limits on voters’ information access via electoral constraints and uneven media exposure; and cognitive ability by de-emphasizing political education and interest. Societal standards of success and daily needs also divert individuals' attention away from politics. Voters conclude that retaining the regime better serves their individual interests, and settle for the incumbent, the least dissatisfactory option. My findings will also better illustrate why the PAP regime is retained by voters, despite the populace exhibiting socio-economic characteristics supposedly more conducive to democratization.