KNOWLEDGE AND VALUES: A TALE OF TWO DEBATES

Abstract

The value-free ideal (VFI) in the philosophy of science states that scientists should attempt to minimise the presence of non-epistemic values in processes of scientific reasoning. While there has been debate surrounding whether the VFI is true or desirable of science, the current philosophical consensus rejects the VFI. The VFI debate has thus since shifted to a broader examination of the various relationships between science and values. On the other hand, in epistemology, there has been debate about pragmatic encroachment, or whether pragmatic factors can make a difference to what a subject knows. This thesis argues for and defends the claim that the VFI debate and the pragmatic encroachment debate are relevantly similar and intimately connected. It explores certain key arguments that have been ventured in both debates, and also seeks to draw out some tentative avenues for future research that acknowledging this connection might open up.