INVESTIGATING THE DISTINCTIVE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF MORAL CONTEMPT AND DISGUST

Abstract

In differentiating the three other-condemning moral emotions (anger, contempt, disgust), two differing perspectives have been proposed. Recent findings are in favor of the sociofunctional approach over the CAD triad hypothesis, but few studies have directly compared moral contempt and disgust from this approach. Addressing this gap in the literature, we sought to distinguish moral contempt from disgust based on their social functions. Specifically, we tested whether anger, contempt, and disgust would vary depending on the cost imposed by a moral violation, and on perceived control over a transgressor. Using a 2x2 fully-between subjects design, participants (N = 220) read moral violation scenarios in which the target of violation (self vs other) and transgressor (friend vs stranger) were varied. Affective responses and endorsements of emotivational goals and action tendencies were measured. Findings largely unsupported the hypotheses. More generally, partial support was found for both the CAD triad hypothesis and sociofunctional approach to differentiating the three other-condemning moral emotions. It is recommended that future research look into differentiating anger, contempt, and disgust from an integrated dimensional and discrete view of emotions, which is suggested to better explain the findings in this study.