Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/132057
DC FieldValue
dc.titleTrade with assignats or landbank money: Equilibria in a finite-person strategic market game
dc.contributor.authorJayawardene, A.K.
dc.contributor.authorShubik, M.
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-29T02:51:46Z
dc.date.available2016-11-29T02:51:46Z
dc.date.issued1997-03
dc.identifier.citationJayawardene, A.K., Shubik, M. (1997-03). Trade with assignats or landbank money: Equilibria in a finite-person strategic market game. Journal of Mathematical Economics 27 (2) : 143-162. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
dc.identifier.issn03044068
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/132057
dc.description.abstractWe consider a simplified economy with a finite number of consumers in which a fixed quantity of a perishable commodity becomes available in each of a denumerably infinite number of time periods. There is an initial distribution of wealth. The consumers bid for the commodity every period and the commodity is distributed in proportion to the bids. The total bid is then redistributed among the consumers in proportion to their remaining wealth. We investigate the existence and uniqueness of equilibria in the economy.
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectEquilibrium solutions
dc.subjectFinite person game
dc.subjectStrategic market games
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentMATHEMATICS
dc.description.sourcetitleJournal of Mathematical Economics
dc.description.volume27
dc.description.issue2
dc.description.page143-162
dc.description.codenJMECD
dc.identifier.isiutNOT_IN_WOS
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