The Politics of Power Succession in Post-Deng China

Abstract

Hu Jintao, Vice President of the People's Republic of China (PRC), was appointed as a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission by the Fifth Plenum of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held in Beijing from 19 to 22 Sept 1999. A few days later, on 27 Sept, when President Jiang Zemin met Singapore Senior Minister SM Lee Kuan Yew in Shanghai, Jiang claimed that it was the responsibility of old leaders to groom the younger generation of political leaders. It is increasingly clear so far Hu has become the candidate to succeed Jiang Zemin as the core of the fourth generation of the CCP leadership in the next party congress in 2002. The appointment has aroused the interest of Zhongnanhai (China's White House) watchers both inside & outside China. Why is Jiang Zemin willing to pass his powers to Hu Jintao? Will it be a smooth transition from the third to the fourth generation of leadership? Is the CCP becoming mature in dealing with the power succession issue? Given the fact that power succession has troubled the CCP leadership since 1949, such questions are not entirely baseless. The appointment of Hu Jintao gives us an opportunity to examine what the Jiang Zemin-centered new leadership has learned from past experience, to what degree power succession has been institutionalized, & what challenges are ahead for the leadership.