Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00499.x
DC Field | Value | |
---|---|---|
dc.title | Mental Maps | |
dc.contributor.author | Blumson, B. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-06-01T10:17:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-06-01T10:17:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012-09 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Blumson, B. (2012-09). Mental Maps. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2) : 413-434. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00499.x | |
dc.identifier.issn | 00318205 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/124454 | |
dc.description.abstract | It's often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis-the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the same kind of compositional and recursive structure. © 2011 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC. | |
dc.description.uri | http://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00499.x | |
dc.source | Scopus | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.contributor.department | PHILOSOPHY | |
dc.description.doi | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00499.x | |
dc.description.sourcetitle | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research | |
dc.description.volume | 85 | |
dc.description.issue | 2 | |
dc.description.page | 413-434 | |
dc.identifier.isiut | 000308873700009 | |
Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications |
Show simple item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.