Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00499.x
DC FieldValue
dc.titleMental Maps
dc.contributor.authorBlumson, B.
dc.date.accessioned2016-06-01T10:17:32Z
dc.date.available2016-06-01T10:17:32Z
dc.date.issued2012-09
dc.identifier.citationBlumson, B. (2012-09). Mental Maps. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2) : 413-434. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00499.x
dc.identifier.issn00318205
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/124454
dc.description.abstractIt's often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis-the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the same kind of compositional and recursive structure. © 2011 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00499.x
dc.sourceScopus
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentPHILOSOPHY
dc.description.doi10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00499.x
dc.description.sourcetitlePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
dc.description.volume85
dc.description.issue2
dc.description.page413-434
dc.identifier.isiut000308873700009
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