Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.11.008
Title: Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias
Authors: Fu, Q. 
Li, M.
Keywords: Ability
Conservatism
Reform
Reputation
Issue Date: Feb-2014
Citation: Fu, Q., Li, M. (2014-02). Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias. Journal of Public Economics 110 : 15-25. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.11.008
Abstract: We study the policy choice of an office-holding politician who is concerned with the public's perception of his capabilities. The politician decides whether to maintain the status quo or to conduct a risky reform. The reform's success depends critically on the politician's capabilities, which are privately known to the politician. The public observes both his policy choice and the outcome of the reform, and assesses his competence. We show that the politician may engage in socially detrimental reform in order to be perceived as more capable. We investigate the institutional remedy that balances the gains and costs when the policy maker is subject to reputation concerns. Conservative institutions that thwart beneficial reform may potentially improve social welfare. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
Source Title: Journal of Public Economics
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/114947
ISSN: 00472727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.11.008
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