Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias||Authors:||Fu, Q.
|Issue Date:||Feb-2014||Citation:||Fu, Q., Li, M. (2014-02). Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias. Journal of Public Economics 110 : 15-25. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.11.008||Abstract:||We study the policy choice of an office-holding politician who is concerned with the public's perception of his capabilities. The politician decides whether to maintain the status quo or to conduct a risky reform. The reform's success depends critically on the politician's capabilities, which are privately known to the politician. The public observes both his policy choice and the outcome of the reform, and assesses his competence. We show that the politician may engage in socially detrimental reform in order to be perceived as more capable. We investigate the institutional remedy that balances the gains and costs when the policy maker is subject to reputation concerns. Conservative institutions that thwart beneficial reform may potentially improve social welfare. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.||Source Title:||Journal of Public Economics||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/114947||ISSN:||00472727||DOI:||10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.11.008|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on Oct 16, 2021
WEB OF SCIENCETM
checked on Oct 8, 2021
checked on Oct 14, 2021
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.