On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2292

Title:	On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
Authors:	Khan, M.A. Rath, K.P. Sun, Y.
Issue Date:	Sep-1997
Citation:	Khan, M.A., Rath, K.P., Sun, Y. (1997-09). On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players. Journal of Economic Theory 76 (1) : 13-46. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2292
Abstract:	We present results on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games. We also show by means of counterexamples that the stringent conditions on the cardinality of action sets cannot be relaxed, and thus resolve questions which have remained open since Schmeidler's 1973 paper.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. © 1997 Academic Press.
Source Title:	Journal of Economic Theory
URI:	http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/103796
ISSN:	00220531
DOI:	10.1006/jeth.1997.2292
Appears in Collections:	Staff Publications

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