Strategic Corporate Governance, Employment Risk, and Firm Risk Taking: A Three-Essay Investigation in the U.S. and Taiwan

Abstract

This dissertation comprises three studies investigating how corporate governance affects firm risk taking through shaping executives? employment risk. It aims to reconcile inconsistent findings on the impact of corporate governance on firm risk taking in strategic corporate governance literature. The three studies address two particular questions. First, does corporate governance affect firm risk taking through shaping executives? employment risk? And second, how does the relationship vary with distinct market institutions? Based on longitudinal analyses on public firms in the U.S. and Taiwan, the findings provide new insights to resolving debates on the relationship between corporate governance and firm risk taking as well as to relaxing agency theory's simplistic assumptions, including constant managerial risk aversion, congruent shareholder interests, and overlooked social contexts. They also provide important managerial and policy implications in the face of increased executive employment risk around the globe.