Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2012.07.003
Title: Socially optimal social security and education subsidization in a dynastic model with human capital externalities, fertility and endogenous growth
Authors: Yew, S.L.
Zhang, J. 
Keywords: Education subsidization
Fertility
Human capital externalities
Social security
Issue Date: Jan-2013
Source: Yew, S.L., Zhang, J. (2013-01). Socially optimal social security and education subsidization in a dynastic model with human capital externalities, fertility and endogenous growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37 (1) : 154-175. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2012.07.003
Abstract: This paper considers socially optimal government policies in a dynastic family model with physical capital, human capital, endogenous fertility and positive spillovers from average human capital. Such spillovers reduce human capital investment but raise fertility from their social optimum. We first characterize the social optimum with a non-convex feasible set due to the quantity-quality tradeoff concerning children. We then show that social security and education subsidization together, financed by labor income taxes, can fully eliminate the efficiency losses of the spillovers and achieve the social optimum under plausible conditions. However, none of the policies can do so alone. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.
Source Title: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/52101
ISSN: 01651889
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2012.07.003
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

Page view(s)

75
checked on Dec 9, 2017

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.