Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.009
Title: Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs
Authors: Lu, J. 
Ye, L.
Keywords: Auctions
Entry
Information acquisition
Mechanisms
Two-stage auctions
Issue Date: Jan-2013
Source: Lu, J.,Ye, L. (2013-01). Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs. Journal of Economic Theory 148 (1) : 393-408. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.009
Abstract: In auctions with private information acquisition costs, we completely characterize (socially) efficient and (revenue) optimal two-stage mechanisms, with the first stage being an entry right allocation mechanism and the second stage being a traditional private good provision mechanism. Both efficiency and revenue optimality require that the second-stage selling mechanism be ex post efficient and the number of entry slots be endogenously determined. We show that both efficient and optimal entry can be truthfully implemented in dominant strategies, and can also be implemented via all-pay, though not uniform-price or discriminatory-price, auctions. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.
Source Title: Journal of Economic Theory
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/52099
ISSN: 00220531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.009
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