Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs|
|Authors:||Lu, J. |
|Citation:||Lu, J., Ye, L. (2013-01). Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs. Journal of Economic Theory 148 (1) : 393-408. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.009|
|Abstract:||In auctions with private information acquisition costs, we completely characterize (socially) efficient and (revenue) optimal two-stage mechanisms, with the first stage being an entry right allocation mechanism and the second stage being a traditional private good provision mechanism. Both efficiency and revenue optimality require that the second-stage selling mechanism be ex post efficient and the number of entry slots be endogenously determined. We show that both efficient and optimal entry can be truthfully implemented in dominant strategies, and can also be implemented via all-pay, though not uniform-price or discriminatory-price, auctions. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.|
|Source Title:||Journal of Economic Theory|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on May 26, 2018
WEB OF SCIENCETM
checked on Apr 2, 2018
checked on May 25, 2018
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.