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|Title:||Distinguishing belief and imagination|
|Source:||Sinhababu, N. (2013-06). Distinguishing belief and imagination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2) : 152-165. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01449.x|
|Abstract:||Some philosophers (including Urmson, Humberstone, Shah, and Velleman) hold that believing that p distinctively involves applying a norm according to which the truth of p is a criterion for the success or correctness of the attitude. On this view, imagining and assuming differ from believing in that no such norm is applied. I argue against this view with counterexamples showing that applying the norm of truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for distinguishing believing from imagining and assuming. Then I argue that the different functional properties of these mental states are enough to distinguish them, and that norm-application doesn't help us draw the functional distinctions. © 2012 The Author.|
|Source Title:||Pacific Philosophical Quarterly|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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