Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9016-z
Title: Optimal timing of real estate investment under an asymmetric duopoly
Authors: Chu, Y.
Sing, T.F. 
Keywords: Asymmetric demands
Duopoly game
Preemptive strategies
Real options
Issue Date: 2007
Source: Chu, Y., Sing, T.F. (2007). Optimal timing of real estate investment under an asymmetric duopoly. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 34 (3) : 327-345. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9016-z
Abstract: This paper examines the sub-game equilibrium strategies for a duopoly real option model consisting of two firms with asymmetric demand functions. The relative strength of the firms is found to have significant impact on the firms' equilibrium strategies. Preemptive strategies are critical if difference in strength between the two competing firms is relatively small. Short bursts and recession induced overbuilding are two outcomes in the asymmetric duopoly model. The model, however, predicts that the two phenomena occur in earlier phases of market cycles, rather than in the state of depression. In a depressed market with high volatility, the leader and the follower will both choose the waiting strategies. Construction cascade is, therefore, not an expected phenomenon in a depressed market in the asymmetric duopoly framework. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007.
Source Title: Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/46289
ISSN: 08955638
DOI: 10.1007/s11146-007-9016-z
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