Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x
Title: Corporate governance and risk-taking
Authors: John, K.
Litov, L.
Yeung, B. 
Issue Date: 2008
Source: John, K., Litov, L., Yeung, B. (2008). Corporate governance and risk-taking. Journal of Finance 63 (4) : 1679-1728. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x
Abstract: Better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value-enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading to excess risk-avoidance. Further, in better investor protection environments, stakeholders like creditors, labor groups, and the government are less effective in reducing corporate risk-taking for their self-interest. However, arguments can also be made for a negative relationship between investor protection and risk-taking. Using a cross-country panel and a U.S.-only sample, we find that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection. © 2008 The American Finance Association.
Source Title: Journal of Finance
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/44323
ISSN: 00221082
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x
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