Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Geometric approach for logistics outsoursing contracting|
Optimal incentive contract
Simple incentive contract
|Citation:||Mai, Y.-H.,Teo, C.-P.,Miao, L.-X.,Xu, Q. (2010). Geometric approach for logistics outsoursing contracting. SCMIS 2010 - Proceedings of 2010 8th International Conference on Supply Chain Management and Information Systems: Logistics Systems and Engineering : -. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.|
|Abstract:||In this paper, we extend our geometric approach to study the optimal logistics outsourcing contract in the problem with more complex distributions. We propose an approximate method to explore the problem, by using piecewise uniform distributions to approximate the original distributions. With appropriate number of cutting, the approximation hardly leads to any deterioration in the solution, showed by three cases. By using this approach, we provide a numerical comparison for the LCSCR contract and nonlinear cost-sharing contract, which shows that the LCSCR contract performs well when the moral hazard dominates the problem. When the adverse selection dominates, the performance of LCSCR contract becomes worse. In contrast, the nonlinear cost sharing contract performance great in most situation.|
|Source Title:||SCMIS 2010 - Proceedings of 2010 8th International Conference on Supply Chain Management and Information Systems: Logistics Systems and Engineering|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on Jan 26, 2019
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.