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|Title:||On the (Im)possibility of aggregate Message Authentication Codes|
|Authors:||Chan, A.C-F. |
|Citation:||Chan, A.C-F., Castelluccia, C. (2008). On the (Im)possibility of aggregate Message Authentication Codes. IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings : 235-239. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2008.4594983|
|Abstract:||In data aggregation, multiple source nodes send their data to a sink along a concast tree with aggregation done en route so that the sink can obtain the aggregate (which could be the sum, average, etc.) of all these data. End-to-end privacy and aggregate integrity are the two main goals of secure data aggregation. While the privacy goal has been widely studied, providing end-to-end aggregate integrity in the presence of possibly compromised aggregating nodes remains largely an open problem. Message Authentication Codes (MAC) are commonly used to provide end-to-end data integrity in two party settings. Natural extensions of MAC for the data aggregation scenario are considered. It is shown that a straightforward and intuitive refinement of the MAC security model (for the data aggregation setting) is not achievable. A weaker security notion is proposed; whether this notion is achievable remains unclear. © 2008 IEEE.|
|Source Title:||IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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