Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/38757
Title: Time-Varying Rating Standards and The Distorted Incentives of Credit Rating Agencies
Authors: WANG TAO
Keywords: Credit rating agencies, Conflict of interest, Reputation, Time-varying rating standards, Rating inflation
Issue Date: 11-Jan-2013
Source: WANG TAO (2013-01-11). Time-Varying Rating Standards and The Distorted Incentives of Credit Rating Agencies. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: Credit rating agencies have been widely criticized to issue inflated ratings due to the issuer-pay business model. This thesis analyses the credit rating standards and tests whether reputation concerns are powerful enough to discipline the rating agencies. I argue that due to rating agencies' distorted incentives, credit ratings are more likely to be inflated when corporate bond investors are more risk-averse and the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve is higher. The empirical study using a large dataset of credit ratings from 1985 to 2011 verifies such hypothesis and suggests that reputation concerns are not always powerful enough to serve as a self-disciplining mechanism. Besides, I find that the sensitivity of credit ratings on the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve is higher for complex firms as well as risky firms. Such findings provide further evidence for the distorted incentives of credit rating agencies.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/38757
Appears in Collections:Ph.D Theses (Open)

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