To cheat or not to cheat? The Strategic Decision of Electoral Fraud in Competitive Autocracies

Abstract

Why does pressure to hold free and fair elections by the opposition prevent some competitive autocrats from stealing elections but not others? My paper illustrates how extent of power-sharing in the autocratic party determines the decision to either refrain from ballot-rigging or try to cling to power through electoral fraud when the opposition can credibly threaten a massive civil disobedience against tainted elections. I argue that diffused power in the ruling party/high power-sharing amongst party elites makes the autocrat refrain from electoral rigging, even at the risk of losing, when there is a high threat that the opposition will lead a large-scale civil disobedience to challenge tainted election results. While in the case of concentrated power in the ruling party/low power-sharing amongst party elites the autocrat will rig elections to cling to power even when there is a high threat of civil disobedience following suit. I analyze the contrasting cases of the Socialist Party of Serbia and Institutional Republican Party in Mexico to test my theory.