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|Title:||Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining|
|Authors:||In, Y. |
Inefficiency and delay
|Citation:||In, Y., Serrano, R. (2004). Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53 (3) : 385-399. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00087-8|
|Abstract:||We study a bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous agenda. In the procedure, proposals must be made on only one issue at a time, although the proposer can choose which issue to bring to the table. When bargaining frictions are small, there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements, including ones with delay. However, equilibrium payoffs cannot be made arbitrarily small-perpetual disagreement cannot be supported in equilibrium. This multiplicity contrasts with the uniqueness found in the literature for a procedure where offers can be made in any subset of remaining issues. © 2003 Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.|
|Source Title:||Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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