Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/16221
Title: Free Entry & Social Welfare
Authors: HUANG JINGYING
Keywords: free entry game, welfare, excess/insufficient entry
Issue Date: 28-May-2007
Citation: HUANG JINGYING (2007-05-28). Free Entry & Social Welfare. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This paper examines excess entry problems in simultaneous free entry games of homogeneous product markets. We start our discussion from the static model, then extend to the dynamic model, and incorporate tax as an additional variable to evaluate the excess/insufficient entry problems. While the static model has high possibility of insufficient entry, an unregulated entry process in the dynamic model usually leads to excess entry. This phenomenon becomes more significant especially when the entry game is played for several rounds. Properties of social welfare under different market circumstances are also discussed. Finally, we numerically solve the tax/subsidy curves which maximize the social welfare under different market environments.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/16221
Appears in Collections:Master's Theses (Open)

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormatAccess SettingsVersion 
Huang Jingying_M.Soc.Sci._Economics_Free Entry and Social Welfare_2007.pdf316.53 kBAdobe PDF

OPEN

NoneView/Download

Page view(s)

209
checked on Dec 30, 2018

Download(s)

103
checked on Dec 30, 2018

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.