Mencius and Xunzi: On moral agency and the concept of Neng

Abstract

This thesis develops a detailed diagnosis of Xunzi's critique of Mencius that aims at illuminating some particular concerns Xunzi has with Mencian self-cultivation. My strategy for this is to spell out the relationship between Xunzia??s criticism of Mencius using the distinction between capacity (keyi ???a>Y) and ability (neng e??) and his idea of moral agency. This will lay the ground for the central aim of my thesis, which is to defend Mencius from Xunzia??s critique by resolving these concerns. The thrust of my defense lies in showing Xunzia??s misconceptions of Mencian moral agency and his hortatory usage of the term a??neng.a?? The progression of my argument shall extend our understanding of the substantive differences between Mencius and Xunzi on moral development and achievement, particularly as regards how they think the heart-mind in terms of its directedness (zhi ???) is set and nourished towards the ethical ideal.