“MIRROR MIRROR ON THE WALL, THEY ARE NOT THE FAIREST OF THEM ALL”: MIRRORS INCREASE REJECTIONS IN ULTIMATUM GAMES

Abstract

Ultimatum game is a two party decision making in which one player (player 1) proposes a split and the other player (player 2) accepts or rejects the split. If player 2 accepts the split, both players get their respective portions of money. If player 2 rejects the split, both players get nothing. Although rationality assumptions within economics suggest that player 2 should accept all non-zero offers, various studies have documented that players reject non-zero offers. I propose and find in a laboratory experiment that increasing objective self-awareness (using a mirror) leads to an increase in rejection rates by player 2. I find marginal support that affective reactions to unfair offers and cognitive evaluations of player 2 actions might be plausible reasons for this increase in rejections.