Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x
Title: On an argument for functional invariance
Authors: Pelczar, M. 
Keywords: Consciousness
Dualism
Functionalism
Naturalism
Issue Date: Sep-2008
Citation: Pelczar, M. (2008-09). On an argument for functional invariance. Minds and Machines 18 (3) : 373-377. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x
Abstract: The principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of phenomenal experience. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Source Title: Minds and Machines
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/132366
ISSN: 09246495
DOI: 10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

2
checked on Dec 6, 2018

WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations

2
checked on Nov 27, 2018

Page view(s)

28
checked on Nov 8, 2018

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.