Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00539.x
Title: Income tax evasion and the fear of ruin
Authors: Chander, P. 
Issue Date: May-2007
Citation: Chander, P. (2007-05). Income tax evasion and the fear of ruin. Economica 74 (294) : 315-328. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00539.x
Abstract: This paper characterizes the optimal income tax function when the agent is risk averse and the objective of the principal is to maximize a social welfare function. We show that the optimal tax function is generally non-decreasing and concave if the principal's objective is maximin and the agent's utility function satisfies a reasonable condition which we call 'repetitive risk aversion'. It is shown further that in many cases the optimal tax function is similarly concave when the social welfare function is utilitarian. © The London School of Economics and Political Science 2006.
Source Title: Economica
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/132295
ISSN: 00130427
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00539.x
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