Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.10.004
Title: Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition
Authors: Martimort, D.
Semenov, A. 
Keywords: Asymmetric information
Common agency
Contributions
Lobbying competition
Issue Date: Apr-2008
Source: Martimort, D., Semenov, A. (2008-04). Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition. Journal of Public Economics 92 (3-4) : 456-481. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.10.004
Abstract: Polarized interest groups compete to influence a decision-maker through monetary contributions. The decision-maker chooses a one-dimensional policy and has private information about his ideal point. Competition between interest groups under asymmetric information yields a rich pattern of equilibrium strategies and payoffs. Policies are systematically biased towards the decision-maker's ideal point and it may sometimes lead to a "laissez-faire" equilibrium where the decision-maker is freed from any influence. Either the most extreme decision-makers or the most moderate ones may get information rent depending on their ideological bias. The market for influence may exhibit segmentation with interest groups keeping an unchallenged influence on ideologically close-by decision-makers. Interest groups refrain from contributing when there is too much uncertainty on the decision-maker's ideology and when the latter is ideologically too far away. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Source Title: Journal of Public Economics
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/132293
ISSN: 00472727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.10.004
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

7
checked on Mar 27, 2018

WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations

7
checked on Mar 27, 2018

Page view(s)

7
checked on Mar 11, 2018

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.