Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/129146
Title: THE UNFEASIBILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RECOMBINATION
Authors: TAY QING LUN
Keywords: david lewis, principle of recombination, modal metaphysics, metaphysics, philosophy, analytic philosophy
Issue Date: 8-Aug-2016
Source: TAY QING LUN (2016-08-08). THE UNFEASIBILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RECOMBINATION. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: In On the Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis discusses the principle of recombination. It is a principle conceptualised to give us a precise sense what it means for there to be a plenitude of worlds in modal realism, and to explain why a plenitude of worlds is the case. Lewis notes a distinction needs to be made between the qualified and unqualified principles of recombination, and he argues only the qualified principle may get the above work done. On the contrary, Daniel Nolan argues the unqualified principle of recombination does not have the problems Lewis thinks it has, and it may and should serve as the principle that can explain the above. In addition, Nolan thinks other theories of modality may help themselves to the unqualified formulation of the principle of recombination. In this thesis, I argue the principle of recombination in both its qualified and unqualified forms is unfeasible.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/129146
Appears in Collections:Master's Theses (Open)

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