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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00321.x
| Title: | Outsourcing, Product Quality, and Contract Enforcement | Authors: | Lu, Y. Ng, T. Tao, Z. |
Issue Date: | Mar-2012 | Citation: | Lu, Y., Ng, T., Tao, Z. (2012-03). Outsourcing, Product Quality, and Contract Enforcement. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 21 (1) : 1-30. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00321.x | Abstract: | Does outsourcing compromise product quality? Does sound contract enforcement alleviate this concern? We offer a simple model to illustrate how outsourcing leads to lower product quality and how contract enforcement helps mitigate this problem. These theoretical predictions are borne out of a survey of 2,400 firms in China conducted by the World Bank in 2003. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. | Source Title: | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy | URI: | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/124310 | ISSN: | 10586407 | DOI: | 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00321.x |
| Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications |
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