DESIGN OF A BANKABLE AND RESILIENT FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT FOR PPP PROJECTS USING GAME THEORY WITH MULTI-AGENT SIMULATION

Abstract

THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT, ESPECIALLY THE DEBT ARRANGEMENT, DETERMINES THE SUCCESS OF A PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP) PROJECT. CONSIDERING THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT PERIOD, THIS DISSERTATION ATTEMPTS TO HELP THE PRIVATE SECTOR PROPERLY MANAGE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT RISK OF PPP PROJECTS, I.E., THE FAILURE OF ACHIEVING A FINANCIAL CLOSE, FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF BANKABILITY AND CRISIS-RESILIENCE. FOR THE ABOVE PURPOSE, THIS DISSERTATION PROPOSES SEVERAL MODELS, INCLUDING THE FUZZY AHP-BASED BANKABILITY CRITERIA RANKING APPROACH, THE LOAN ARRANGEMENT SIGNALING GAME MODEL, THE DOUBLE AUCTION GAME MODEL AND THE DEBT TERMS? BARGAINING MODEL TO EXPLORE THE CRITICAL BANKABILITY CRITERIA AND SIMULATE THE MAJOR INTERACTIONS BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS DURING THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT AND LOAN APPLICATION PROCESS. IN ORDER TO CAPTURES THE OSCILLATORY BEHAVIOR OF RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS IN THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR ADAPTION TO ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS, A MUL