Global Collective Action: A Structural Perspective on Energy and Climate Cooperation

Abstract

Why does the level of international cooperation vary across countries and issue areas? How can we explain variances in energy and climate policy outcomes across countries? This thesis contends that domestic structural and political attributes like the level of globalisation, number of veto players, and quality of governing institutions explain a large part of variances in energy and climate policy outcomes across countries and by extension level of international cooperation. Using a large-N quantitative (N=60, T=20) research this thesis concludes that in the area of energy and climate policy the world overall is on a convergent path; a sort of marathon to the top. The pace of change, however, is extremely slow and may not be sufficient to avert a climate catastrophe. Nevertheless, states across the world are phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, diversifying national energy baskets, using energy more efficiently, and cutting down the growth rate of carbon emissions. However, these trends differ between the OECD and non-OECD countries, with the latter showing a lot more variance than the former - the United States remains an outlier. The higher quality of governing institutions, higher levels of globalisation, and membership in international environmental institutions, all have a favourable impact on energy and climate policy outcomes. The greater number of veto players, however, is negatively associated with these outcomes. Furthermore, contrary to the vi traditional belief, democracy and party ideology have no significant explanatory power.