Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games||Authors:||Chua, V.C.H.
|Issue Date:||Jun-2003||Citation:||Chua, V.C.H., Huang, H.C. (2003-06). The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games. Social Choice and Welfare 20 (3) : 387-403. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200186||Abstract:||In this paper, we show that although the Shapley-Shubik index is immune to the donation paradox in weighted binary games, extension of the index to ternary games along the direction suggested in Felsenthal and Machover (1996, 1997) will cause it to be vulnerable to the paradox and this is the case as long as the number of players in the game exceeds three. This undermines the attractiveness of the Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of a priori voting power.||Source Title:||Social Choice and Welfare||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/63372||ISSN:||01761714||DOI:||10.1007/s003550200186|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on May 19, 2019
WEB OF SCIENCETM
checked on Apr 29, 2019
checked on May 13, 2019
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.