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Title: The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games
Authors: Chua, V.C.H.
Huang, H.C. 
Issue Date: Jun-2003
Citation: Chua, V.C.H., Huang, H.C. (2003-06). The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games. Social Choice and Welfare 20 (3) : 387-403. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: In this paper, we show that although the Shapley-Shubik index is immune to the donation paradox in weighted binary games, extension of the index to ternary games along the direction suggested in Felsenthal and Machover (1996, 1997) will cause it to be vulnerable to the paradox and this is the case as long as the number of players in the game exceeds three. This undermines the attractiveness of the Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of a priori voting power.
Source Title: Social Choice and Welfare
ISSN: 01761714
DOI: 10.1007/s003550200186
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

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