Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Double-edged transparency in teams
Authors: Bag, P.K. 
Pepito, N.
Keywords: Complementarity of tasks
Markov strategies
Team project
Transparency of outcomes
Issue Date: Aug-2011
Citation: Bag, P.K., Pepito, N. (2011-08). Double-edged transparency in teams. Journal of Public Economics 95 (7-8) : 531-542. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: In a team project with significant complementarities between various players' individual tasks, news of early success by some encourages others to push ahead with their own tasks while lack of success has the opposite effect. This ex-post disparity in incentives created gives rise to two differing implications, ex ante, for an ideal team transparency. Sometimes it is better to commit to complete secrecy within the team of the various participants' interim progress as it mitigates the negative effect of failures. In some other situations, commitment to full disclosure is better as players are then encouraged to be proactive by exerting efforts in the early rounds and motivate other team members into continued activities by way of interim progress. Transparency (of outcomes) has thus double edges - it can boost incentives or dampen incentives. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.
Source Title: Journal of Public Economics
ISSN: 00472727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.01.009
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.


checked on Jun 20, 2022


checked on Jun 20, 2022

Page view(s)

checked on Jun 23, 2022

Google ScholarTM



Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.