Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.013
DC FieldValue
dc.titleOptimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
dc.contributor.authorLu, J.
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-05T10:25:39Z
dc.date.available2014-05-05T10:25:39Z
dc.date.issued2012-03
dc.identifier.citationLu, J. (2012-03). Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities. Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2) : 561-575. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.013
dc.identifier.issn08998256
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/52121
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies optimal auction design with asymmetric linear financial externalities among bidders. When the matrix γ that relates bidders' payoffs to their payments is nonsingular, the payment-related component in the design objective must equal a unique linear combination of its counterparts in bidder's payoffs. If all multipliers of the linear combination are nonnegative, a modified Myerson procedure is discovered for deriving the optimal design. If any multiplier is negative, an arbitrarily high value can be achieved for design objective by setting proper fixed transfers to bidders. When the matrix γ is singular, the unbounded optimum result typically prevails. We applied our method to auctions with cross shareholdings and charity auctions for revenue-maximizing and efficient designs. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.013
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectAuction design
dc.subjectCharity auction
dc.subjectCross shareholdings
dc.subjectEffective payments
dc.subjectFinancial externalities
dc.subjectPayment-coefficient matrix
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.013
dc.description.sourcetitleGames and Economic Behavior
dc.description.volume74
dc.description.issue2
dc.description.page561-575
dc.description.codenGEBEE
dc.identifier.isiut000301219700008
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