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Title: Strategic exploitation of a common resource under environmental risk
Authors: Fesselmeyer, E. 
Santugini, M.
Keywords: Conservation
Dynamic games
Environmental risk
Renewable resources
Tragedy of the commons
Issue Date: Jan-2013
Citation: Fesselmeyer, E., Santugini, M. (2013-01). Strategic exploitation of a common resource under environmental risk. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37 (1) : 125-136. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: We study the effect of environmental risk on the extraction of a common resource. Using a dynamic and non-cooperative game in which an environmental event impacts the renewability and the quality of the resource, we show that the anticipation of such an event has an ambiguous effect on extraction and the tragedy of the commons. A risk of a reduction in the renewability induces the agents to extract less today while a risk of a deterioration in the quality has the opposite effect. Moreover, when environmental risk induces conservation, the tragedy of the commons is worsened. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.
Source Title: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
ISSN: 01651889
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2012.06.010
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

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