Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: The tragedy of the commons revisited
Authors: Hartwick, J.M.
Yeung, D.W.K. 
Issue Date: 1997
Citation: Hartwick, J.M.,Yeung, D.W.K. (1997). The tragedy of the commons revisited. Pacific Economic Review 2 (1) : 45-62. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: The Malthus-Hardin tragedy of the commons is formulated as a dynamic game between "clans". At each date a member of a clan desires more newborns of her/his type and more current consumption, harvested from the commons. Equilibrium in the dynamic game yields a steady state level of per capita consumption and a steady population level for each clan (births equal deaths). Four outcomes are obtained, depending on the assumptions about the discount rates of members of a clan and about the mode of competition for "large populations" for each clan. Lack of property rights for agricultural land in the commons leads to equilibrium with excessive populations and low per capita consumption.
Source Title: Pacific Economic Review
ISSN: 1361374X
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

Page view(s)

checked on Sep 22, 2022

Google ScholarTM


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.