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Title: | A not-so-simple view of intentional action | Authors: | Chan, D.K. | Issue Date: | Mar-1999 | Citation: | Chan, D.K. (1999-03). A not-so-simple view of intentional action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1) : 1-16. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. | Abstract: | The Simple View (SV) holds that for someone to intentionally A, he must intend to A. Critics of SV point to intentional actions which, due to belief-conditions or consistency constraints, agents cannot intend. By recognizing species of intention which vary with the agent's confidence in acting, I argue that the stringency of consistency constraints depends on the agent's confidence. A sophisticated SV holds that the species of intending is related to the degree of intentionality of the action. Finally, I show that where agents do what they believe impossible, without intending to do so, the action is not intentional. © 1999 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishers Ltd. | Source Title: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly | URI: | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/50039 | ISSN: | 02790750 |
Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications |
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