Squaring the Mediterranean Circle: British Grand Strategy and Naval Planning in the Mediterranean, 1932-1939

Abstract

British imperial defence was always premised upon maintaining a dominant position in the Mediterranean. This position was seriously challenged when Italy became a significant Mediterranean power during the 1930s. Planners in the British Admiralty considered Italy to be a threat that should not be underestimated, yet were always confident about the Royal Navy?s ultimate ability to best its Italian counterpart should it come to a fight. This thesis explores the Admiralty?s attempts to formulate plans for defending Britain?s Mediterranean position during a period which saw the emergence of multiple threats to the British Empire in the form of Germany, Italy and Japan. It argues that while the Admiralty understood the need to dominate the Mediterranean, it was always concerned that potential losses accruing from an Anglo-Italian war which would compromise the defence of other theatres. This was ultimately decisive in shaping the Admiralty?s naval planning in the Mediterranean theatre.