RAWLS AND MENTAL DISABILITY

Abstract

Martha Nussbaum, together with others, have criticised Rawls's theory for being unable to account for the claims of persons with mental disabilities. In this thesis, I examine their criticisms, and show that they (i) pose problems at different points of Rawls's theory, instead of simply at the level of the original position; (ii) they are mostly either too general to pose the kinds of serious problems to Rawls's theory as they intended, or they miss the mark; but (iii) some of them can be reformulated to do so. I then consider what resources Rawls's theory has to respond to these criticisms, and assess how well it responds to them. I conclude that while there are several gaps in Rawls's account of our treatment of the mentally disabled, it seems largely adequate. In fact, it appears to have more provisions for the mentally disabled than many critics think.