Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: The symmetric rendezvous-evasion game
Authors: Alpern, S.
Lim, W.S. 
Keywords: Rendezvous search
Zero-sum game
Issue Date: 1998
Citation: Alpern, S.,Lim, W.S. (1998). The symmetric rendezvous-evasion game. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 36 (3) : 948-959. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: E. J. Anderson and R. R. Weber, J. Appl. Probab., 28 (1990), pp. 839-851, considered the problem of two rendezvousers, R1,R2. randomly placed among n indistinguishable locations, who seek to meet in least expected time, using the same mixed strategy. We retain their dynamics but modify the rendezvousers' aim to meeting each other before either encounters an enemy searcher S. We solve this zero-sum game in minimal space (3 locations) and time (2 steps after placement), and find that optimal play requires that the rendezvous team use a mixture over behavioral strategies. While such complicated strategies are known to be necessary in principal for team games (the theory of Isbell and Alpern), we believe this is the first naturally occuring game where such a solution is derived. (An earlier paper by Lim solved a similar game in which R1 and R2 were allowed to use different strategies and joint randomization.).
Source Title: SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
ISSN: 03630129
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

Page view(s)

checked on May 12, 2019

Google ScholarTM


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.