Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Selectivity in organizational rule violations||Authors:||Lehman, D.W.
|Issue Date:||2009||Citation:||Lehman, D.W.,Ramanujam, R. (2009). Selectivity in organizational rule violations. Academy of Management Review 34 (4) : 643-657. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.||Abstract:||Organizational rule violations are more likely when performance falls below aspiration levels. We propose that such violations are systematically selective and that this selectivity emerges during the problemistic search for solutions to the performance shortfall. During this search, contextual conditions (structural secrecy and coupling between violations and outcomes) and characteristics of rules (enforceability, procedural emphasis, and connectedness) direct attention and shape risk perceptions. Consequently, some rules are more likely to be violated than others. © 2009 Academy of Management Review.||Source Title:||Academy of Management Review||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/44684||ISSN:||03637425|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on Oct 25, 2020
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.