Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.005
DC FieldValue
dc.titleStarting high and ending with nothing: The role of anchors and power in negotiations
dc.contributor.authorSchweinsberg, M.
dc.contributor.authorKu, G.
dc.contributor.authorWang, C.S.
dc.contributor.authorPillutla, M.M.
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-09T09:16:42Z
dc.date.available2013-10-09T09:16:42Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationSchweinsberg, M., Ku, G., Wang, C.S., Pillutla, M.M. (2012). Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of anchors and power in negotiations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1) : 226-231. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.005
dc.identifier.issn00221031
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/44649
dc.description.abstractMost research suggests that negotiators gain value by making first offers in negotiations. The current research examines the proposition that extreme first offers offend their recipients and cause them to walk away, resulting in an impasse. Results across two experiments support this proposition. As a result, extreme offers can be risky: even though they can anchor counteroffers and final outcomes, bringing benefit to the offerer, they only do so when impasses are avoided. In addition, we find support for the proposition that power moderates the relationship between extreme offers and impasses: although low- and high-power negotiators are equally offended by extreme offers, it is the low-power negotiators who walk away from the negotiation. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.005
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectAnchor
dc.subjectFirst offer
dc.subjectImpasse
dc.subjectNegotiation
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentMANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATION
dc.description.doi10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.005
dc.description.sourcetitleJournal of Experimental Social Psychology
dc.description.volume48
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.page226-231
dc.description.codenJESPA
dc.identifier.isiut000298935900025
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