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|Title:||Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions||Authors:||Sethuraman, J.
Partially ordered sets
Social welfare function
|Issue Date:||2006||Citation:||Sethuraman, J., Teo, C.-P., Vohra, R.V. (2006). Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 128 (1) : 232-254. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.006||Abstract:||This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earlier characterization (as Generalized Majority Rules) by Moulin (Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988) for single-peaked domains. We also describe a domain where anonymous and monotonic ASWFs exist only when there are an odd number of agents. This is a counter-example to a claim by Muller (Int. Econ. Rev. 23 (1982) 609), who asserted that the existence of 3-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs guaranteed the existence of n-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs for any n > 3. Both results build upon the integer programming approach to the study of ASWFs introduced in Sethuraman et al. (Math. Oper. Res. 28 (2003) 309). © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.||Source Title:||Journal of Economic Theory||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/44049||ISSN:||00220531||DOI:||10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.006|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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