Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: A strategy-proof pricing scheme for multiple resource type allocations
Authors: Teo, Y.M. 
Mihailescu, M. 
Keywords: Mechanism design
Pricing scheme
Resource allocation
Selfish agents
VCG mechanism
Issue Date: 2009
Citation: Teo, Y.M.,Mihailescu, M. (2009). A strategy-proof pricing scheme for multiple resource type allocations. Proceedings of the International Conference on Parallel Processing : 172-179. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: Resource sharing on the Internet is becoming increasingly pervasive. Recently, there is growing interest in distributed systems such as peer-to-peer and grid, with efforts being directed towards resource allocation strategies that incentivize users to share resources. While combinatorial auctions can perform multiple resource type allocations, it is computationally a NP-complete problem. Thus, allocation in large distributed resource sharing systems focuses mainly on a single resource type. We propose a strategy-proof, VCG-based resource pricing scheme for resource allocation in dynamic markets where users behave rationally in meeting their own interest. Our mechanism is designed to meet the needs of large distributed systems, delivering the following key properties: Multiple resource type allocations, individual rationality, incentive compatibility for both buyers and sellers, budget balance and computational efficiency. Simulation evaluation of our prototype based on a centralized implementation demonstrates the viability of our approach, as compared to both traditional and combinatorial auctions. © 2009 IEEE.
Source Title: Proceedings of the International Conference on Parallel Processing
ISBN: 9780769538020
ISSN: 01903918
DOI: 10.1109/ICPP.2009.23
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.


checked on Nov 28, 2021

Page view(s)

checked on Nov 18, 2021

Google ScholarTM



Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.