Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2010.2089533
DC FieldValue
dc.titleOn cooperative settlement between content, transit, and eyeball internet service providers
dc.contributor.authorMa, R.T.B.
dc.contributor.authorChiu, D.M.
dc.contributor.authorLui, J.C.S.
dc.contributor.authorMisra, V.
dc.contributor.authorRubenstein, D.
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-04T07:37:56Z
dc.date.available2013-07-04T07:37:56Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationMa, R.T.B., Chiu, D.M., Lui, J.C.S., Misra, V., Rubenstein, D. (2011). On cooperative settlement between content, transit, and eyeball internet service providers. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 19 (3) : 802-815. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2010.2089533
dc.identifier.issn10636692
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/39274
dc.description.abstractInternet service providers (ISPs) depend on one another to provide global network services. However, the profit-seeking nature of the ISPs leads to selfish behaviors that result in inefficiencies and disputes in the network. This concern is at the heart of the network neutrality debate, which also asks for an appropriate compensation structure that satisfies all types of ISPs. Our previous work showed in a general network model that the Shapley value has several desirable properties, and that if applied as the profit model, selfish ISPs would yield globally optimal routing and interconnecting decisions. In this paper, we use a more detailed and realistic network model with three classes of ISPs: content, transit, and eyeball. This additional detail enables us to delve much deeper into the implications of a Shapley settlement mechanism. We derive closed-form Shapley values for more structured ISP topologies and develop a dynamic programming procedure to compute the Shapley values under more diverse Internet topologies. We also identify the implications on the bilateral compensation between ISPs and the pricing structures for differentiated services. In practice, these results provide guidelines for solving disputes between ISPs and for establishing regulatory protocols for differentiated services and the industry. © 2010 IEEE.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2010.2089533
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectCoalition games
dc.subjectInternet service provider (ISP) settlement
dc.subjectnetwork economics
dc.subjectnetwork neutrality
dc.subjectShapley value
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentCOMPUTER SCIENCE
dc.description.doi10.1109/TNET.2010.2089533
dc.description.sourcetitleIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
dc.description.volume19
dc.description.issue3
dc.description.page802-815
dc.description.codenIEANE
dc.identifier.isiut000291682000015
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